Skip to content

AD-TRUST-04: No trusts should lack SID filtering (quarantine)

ID AD-TRUST-04
Severity High
Suite Active Directory (on-premises)
Product Active Directory
Feature Trusts
Security area External access and sharing
Resource type Trust
User impact of fixing Medium
Effort to fix Medium
Framework controls nist-800-53-r5:AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement
nist-800-53-r5:SC-7 Boundary Protection
MITRE ATT&CK T1134.005
Reads from On-premises Active Directory

Trusts with weak SID filtering are a significant security risk:

  • SID History Vulnerability: Attackers can exploit SID history to elevate privileges across trust boundaries
  • Privilege Escalation Path: Compromised external accounts can gain access to privileged resources
  • Audit Finding: Most security audits flag weak SID filtering on inter-forest trusts as high-risk
  • Compliance Gap: Fails compliance requirements for many security frameworks

This test identifies external and forest trusts with weak SID filtering, enabling targeted remediation:

  • External trusts are weak when the QUARANTINED_DOMAIN bit (0x4) is not set
  • Forest trusts are weak when the TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL bit (0x40) is set (SID history enabled)
  • Intra-forest (parent-child) trusts are excluded because they do not support quarantine
  • MIT Kerberos realm trusts are excluded as SID filtering does not apply to them

Detective

Immediate Actions:

  • Review each trust with weak SID filtering to determine if it can be strengthened
  • For external trusts: enable SID filtering (netdom trust /quarantine:yes)
  • For forest trusts: disable SID history (netdom trust /enablesidhistory:no)
  • Test applications that rely on cross-trust authentication before making changes

Long-term Strategy:

  • Replace external trusts with forest trusts where possible
  • Implement selective authentication for sensitive resources
  • Regularly audit trust configurations
  • Document any trusts that must remain weak with business justification

Commands to Strengthen SID Filtering:

Terminal window
# External trust — enable quarantine (SID filtering)
netdom trust <TrustingDomain> /domain:<TrustedDomain> /quarantine:yes
# Forest trust — disable SID history
netdom trust <TrustingDomain> /domain:<TrustedDomain> /enablesidhistory:no

This test derives trust classification and SID filtering status from the trustAttributes LDAP attribute and trustType:

  • External trusts: trustType in 1,2 and trustAttributes does not have FOREST_TRANSITIVE (0x8) or WITHIN_FOREST (0x20)
  • Forest trusts: trustAttributes has FOREST_TRANSITIVE (0x8)
  • Weak external trusts: QUARANTINED_DOMAIN (0x4) is not set
  • Weak forest trusts: TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL (0x40) is set (SID history enabled)

The test displays:

  • Target domain of the trust
  • Trust direction (Inbound, Outbound, or Bidirectional)
  • Trust type (External Downlevel, Domain Uplevel, MIT Kerberos, or DCE)
  • Whether the trust is a forest or external trust
  • The reason for weak SID filtering
  • Test-MtAdTrustQuarantinedCount - Count of quarantined vs non-quarantined external/forest trusts
  • Test-MtAdTrustInterForestCount - Identifies external trusts that should be quarantined
  • Test-MtAdTrustDetails - Complete trust configuration details

Mito check. Author: soulemike. Open-source licences.

Open-source licences. CIS Benchmark material © Center for Internet Security, Inc.; CISA SCuBA baselines are public domain (CC0).

© 2026 Virtual Petals. Mito is a Virtual Petals service, hosted in Microsoft Azure UAE North.