MT.1223: Agent Identities should not have high-risk Microsoft Graph permissions (Preview).
| ID | MT.1223 |
| Severity | High |
| Suite | Mito |
| Product | Entra ID |
| Feature | Agent identities |
| Security area | AI and agents |
| Resource type | Agent |
| User impact of fixing | Low |
| Effort to fix | Medium |
| Framework controls | nist-800-53-r5:AC-6 Least Privilege |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1078.004, T1098.001, T1098.003 |
| Reads from | Microsoft Graph |
| Lifecycle | Preview |
What this checks and how to fix it
Section titled “What this checks and how to fix it”Agent Identities should not have high-risk Microsoft Graph permissions.
Agent Identities can be granted Microsoft Graph application permissions and delegated permission scopes. Some permissions provide a path to privileged control of the tenant if an Agent Identity is compromised.
This check reports Agent Identities assigned permissions that Mito classifies as high risk and that Microsoft does not currently list as blocked for Agent Identities. It evaluates application and delegated grants together and identifies the permission type in each finding.
A Direct attack path can provide privileged control using the reported permission itself. An Indirect attack path requires another permission, configuration, or identity to complete the escalation path. The check evaluates the following permissions:
| Permission | Attack path |
|---|---|
AdministrativeUnit.ReadWrite.All |
Indirect |
DeviceManagementConfiguration.ReadWrite.All |
Indirect |
DeviceManagementRBAC.ReadWrite.All |
Indirect |
Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess |
Direct |
PrivilegedAccess.ReadWrite.AzureADGroup |
Direct |
PrivilegedAssignmentSchedule.ReadWrite.AzureADGroup |
Direct |
PrivilegedEligibilitySchedule.ReadWrite.AzureADGroup |
Indirect |
RoleAssignmentSchedule.ReadWrite.Directory |
Direct |
RoleEligibilitySchedule.ReadWrite.Directory |
Indirect |
RoleManagementPolicy.ReadWrite.AzureADGroup |
Indirect |
RoleManagementPolicy.ReadWrite.Directory |
Indirect |
Remediation action:
Section titled “Remediation action:”- Open the Microsoft Entra admin center and navigate to Entra ID > Agents > Agent identities.
- Locate the reported Agent Identity using its object ID or display name, then review its granted permissions.
- Confirm the business requirement with the Agent Identity’s owner and sponsor. Determine whether the permission was assigned directly or inherited from its Agent Identity Blueprint.
- Remove an unnecessary direct application or delegated grant. For an inherited delegated scope, update the Blueprint’s inheritable permissions to use only the enumerated scopes its agents need.
- If the permission is required, replace it with a narrower Microsoft Graph permission where possible and document the approved exception.
- If the grant was unexpected, review the Agent Identity’s audit and sign-in logs and rotate any credentials that might have been exposed.
Related links
Section titled “Related links”- Manage agent identities in your organization
- Microsoft Graph permissions blocked for agents
- Microsoft Graph permissions reference
- High-risk permission research (Azure tiering)
Mito check. Author: agnivesh. Open-source licences.
Open-source licences. CIS Benchmark material © Center for Internet Security, Inc.; CISA SCuBA baselines are public domain (CC0).
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